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BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
In a civil action plaintiff asserts that the defendants
unlawfully and wrongfully appropriated good will
inherent in the relationship between a firm of public
accountants and their clients and, upon dissolution
failed to account to plaintiff for his share of two partnership assets, to-wit:

1

(a) the good will inherent in the clienl-publtr
accountant relationship, and
(b) work in process at the time of tenrnnat:rn
of the firm.
·
Plaintiff claims alternatively that he is entitled t"
damages for breach of a written agreement dated Marri

7, 1960.

DISPOSITION IN THE LO,VER COURT
The lower court held that the conduct of the de·
fendants toward the plaintiff was not tortious; tha,
defendants were not guilty of any breach of contract; .
that there was no good will inherent in the relationshir
between the firm of public accountants known as Mei· ;
sina, Jackson, Caldwell & Co. and their clients, ano
the court adopted defendants' theory of allocation of
the asset known as work in process.
!

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-Appellant asks this court to reverse tl1t
determinations made by the trial court and for appru·
priate orders and judgments as follows:
A. Determining that the defendants appropriatea
the bulk of the clients of the firm of Messina, Jackson,
Caldwell & Co. during the term of the partnership arnl
that defendants converted a valuable firm asse,t t 0 •11·1t·
2

the good wiJI of the firm, in relevant respects, to the
exclusion of plaintiff.
B. That the Plaintiff-Appellant is entitled to an
~iceountiug for the value of the good will inherent in

a client-accountant relationship with respect to all of
the clients of said firm.
C. That plaintiff is entitled to certain adjustments
iu the allocation of work in process of the firm of
~lessina, Jackson, Caldwell & Co. as of :March 31,
rn62.

D. Alternatively, plaintiff is entitled to damages

in accordance with the provisions of a partnership agreement between the parties dated March 7, 1960.

STATEl\IENT OF FACTS
The material facts are presented, substantially, in
the argument. This statement of facts, therefore, is
presented only as a summary of the facts as they are
developed in the record. At the trial, the plaintiff was
incapacitated as a witness. Except for the testimony
of experts and a small amount of testimony from Mrs.
Jackson and acquaintances of the plaintiff, primarily
with respect to his capacity for work as a public accountant at relevant times, the evidence consists of the testimony of the defendants, Lenore Bateman, the office
manager of defendants, the files and records of .l\Iessina, Jackson, Caldwell & Co., a partnership and other
documentary exhibits.

3

Plaintiff was, during the period relevant to thi,
litigation, a public accountant. He was also authorizeu
to practice law. l-Iowever, the evidence in this case
1
,
a111J
the ~atters in issue here relate to his rights arnl property mterests as a partner of the firm of Messina, Jac-k.
son, Caldwell & Co.
Some time prior to 1952, plaintiff was a parhw
with Marco Messina as a public accountant. Earlier.
plaintiff had been a partner of the firm of Messina.
Jackson & Ulmer (R. 6). Grant Caldwell became 311
employee of the firm of l\'.lessina, Jackson & Ulmer in
1950. Lowell Nielson became an employee at about
the same time ( R. 7) .

As of April 1, 1955, a new partnership agreement
was executed between :Messina, plaintiff, Leon Jack· ,
son and Grant Caldwell whereby Caldwell became a
general partner.
i

i

Marco Messina died August 19, 1959. His estalt
received $7 4,000 from the partnership during the bnl·
ance of the fiscal year ending March 31, 1960 and dur·
ing the next two ensuing fiscal years, in addition to Int
amount due to him by reason of his share of the capital
account, accounts receivable, works in process and otber
tangible assets and "book" assets of the partnership.
In March, 1960, the defendants executed an agree·
ment with plaintiff which was received in evidence J·
Exhibit 5. This agreement recited in substance ti13:
the parties recognized their obligations to the Messm:i
4

, slate to pay a percentage of earnings to it as a result
uf tl1e last partnership agreement during Messina's

lifetime (Exhibit 4) dated as of April I, 1959. It
reaffirmed the intention of the parties that the firm
iroulrl continue in operation after Messina's death and
that the capital accounts and participation in profits
nnd 10sses thereafter would be as follows:
Rulon Jackson
Grant R. Caldwell
Lowell Nielson
Loyd Campbell

303
303
203
203

In the early part of 1961, the defendants notified
plaintiff that they would not honor the 1960 agreement;
that at the payout of the Messina estate the defendants
refused to continue any partnership relationship with
plaintiff; that they would not share clients with him.
It is the position of the plaintiff-Appellant that this
conduct, together with the other facts and circumstances
of the case, demonstrate that by that time defendants
had already assured themselves that they could already
hold most of the clients of the firm and their exclusion
uf the plaintiff constituted an appropriation of the
firm's most valuable asset, to-wit: the good will inherent
in the client relationships. Such conduct also constituted
a breach of contract.

In order to understand plaintiff's position in con!rxt, it is necessary to describe briefly the industry
practices and the recognition of these practices insofar
5

as the firm of Messina, Jackson, Caldwell & C_ ,
Ii, ii
concerned.
The Context: Industry Recognition of Cood Will.

It cannot be disputed in the instant case that publii
accountants buy and sell practices. The good will In.
herent in the relationship between professional puhlir
accountants and the client has a definitive aud deter.
minable economic value. Both local and national pubill
accountant trade organizations have developed an J ,
accept standard procedures and formulae with respeti
to determining the value of these practices and tlie ,
evidence disclosed extensive literature on the subject. ,
The evidence on this phase of the case is treated il ~
greater detail in Points I and IV of the argument
Although all of the defendants were certified public
accountants, none of them offered himself as a witnesi
to deny plaintiff's evidence with respect to the appJic.
able industry practices and formulae or to contradict
the evidence adduced by the plaintiff to the effect thai
the client-accountant relationships which were the asset
of the firm of Messina, Jackson, Caldwell & Co. werr 1
in fact salable and had a determinable market value. :
Defendants called two experts, both of whom testifieu :
concerning specific sales of client accounts by public !
accountants in the area. In one instance the sale 1rn !
by the administrator of the estate of a deceased ac· :
countant and the other was by an accountant who wa) i
leaving the area. One of the defendants' witnesse~. :
Ernest C. Psarras, admitted that there was an industry ,
1

6

prartice of acqumng client accounts from the estate
uf a deceased accountant (R. 564) and from an accountant who was moving to another area and from
au ~.ccountant retiring from the practice (R. 565). He
also admitted that there was a market for established
accounts of an accounting firm ( R. 565).
Good Will of Messina, Jackson, Caldwell & Co.

The various partnership agreements executed by
the parties between 1953 and 1960 (Ex. l through 5
inclusive) and the conduct of the partners and their
employees dea:rly demonstrate that the partners themse!Yes placed value upon good will with clients commensurate with the industry practice. The details of
these agreements and the conduct of the parties is dereloped more fully in Point I of the argument. From
the partnership records plaintiff demonstrated that 118
of the clients, representing 73 % of t_he total fees received during the fiscal year ending March 31, 1962
had been clients of the firm since 1955 or prior thereto.
Only six accounts, representing 3.13% of the fees received, representing new business acquired during the
year prior to March 31, 1962 (Ex. 12). Messina, Jackson, Caldwell & Co. was terminated as a partnership
as of March 31, 1962. The defendants took with them
149 clients, representing fees of $154,0ll.OO. The
plaintiff was totally incapacitated as a public accountant
by the time of the termination of the firm. However,
he entered into a business relationship with Karl Maxwell and Paul Maxwell in May, 1962, and some of

7

the accounts who had been with the old firm be
•
ca111t
clients of Jackson, Maxwell & Co. The evidence dis
closes that the plaintiff actually received no personal
benefit from the business of these clients, but for thi·
purpose of computing damages the plaintiff concedeil
that the fees represented by these accounts and !lie
good will inherent in them might properly be charger!
against the plaintiff in determining the value of the
good will for which he was entitled to receive credit. ,
Fees of the clients in this category were in the sum '.
of $16,865 (Ex. 22). Marco Messina died in August,,
1959. Under the partnership agreement which was then
in effect (Ex. 4), Caldwell and Maxwell, who were the :
surviving general partners, were obligated to pay to the '
Messina estate Messina's share of the capital accounh,
accounts receivable, an amount representing his share
of work in process (in other words, Messina's share
of the tangible and book assets of th~. partnership).
In addition, Messina's estate received for the intan·
gible value not reflected by any book asset or tangible
value an amount equal to his share of the total earn·
ings of the firm for the fiscal year ending March 31,
1960, and two fiscal years thereafter. The estate re·
ceived approximately $74,000 on this formula. Mes· .
sina's estate did not claim any interest in the clients .
of the firm; instead, they were retained as firm clients :
and firm assets. Defendants' counsel admitted, in •
making objections to certain testimony, that the clien:s ;
were firm assets and that the individual partners did !
not have any proprietary interest in them (R. 234, j).

8

()ii

~larch

7, 1960, an agreement was executed between

plaintiff awl the defendants under the terms of which
tlw parties reaffirmed their intention to continue the
Jinn after the payout to the :Messina estate, adjusted
their percentage interest in the partnership and agreed
lhat upon the death or disability of either of the parties to the agreement, certain remedies and provisions
of the prior partnership agreement would be applicable
(Ex. 5). Thus plaintiff was led to believe as late as
the spring of 1960 that all of the assets of the old firm
would be kept intact and that he would participate in
them.
Appropriation of Accounts and Breach of Contract

Grant Caldwell and the other defendants began
their association with lVIessina and Jackson as employees. Caldwell had no professional accounting experience theretofore (R. 318). He admitted that he
nerer did desire to become a partner with the plaintiff.
The only reason he signed the various partnership
agreements was because of Messina (R. 319). From
the beginning of his employment he began to formulate
judgments as to where the clients of the firm would
go in the event the partnership was terminated. At
no time did he disclose to the plaintiff his lack of confidence or his secret calculations with respect to the
disposition of clients (R. 246-247).
Shortly after Messina's death, Caldwell began
assuming the management of the firm operations. The
9

office manager testified that she began looking to h' .
un 111;
what she called "leadership" (R. 349; 240 et seq). 'l'lif
office manager testified as to her discussions with CairJ
well or the other defendants with respect to where tli.'
clients would go if the firm broke up (R. 246, 24 71
She had discussions with Caldwell about personnel
policies, equipment purchases and other managemen:
problems, including the dissatisfaction of defendanb
Nielson and Campbell (R. 236-246). She treatea
these conversations as confidential (R. 236); she dirl
not discuss these matters with Mr. Jackson, althougJ1
it is apparent from the partnership agreement of l9iu
that upon the payout of the Messina estate, Jackson·
and Caldwell would have equal interests in the partner·
ship.
I

I

At least by the end of 1960 defendants Caldwell,
Nielson and Campbell had conversations among them·
selves for the purpose of making effective a plan fo
carry on the firm to the exclusion of the plaintiff. Al
that time or in 1961, they began having meetings wilt
the plaintiff wherein they notified him that they desirea
that he acquiesce in what they referred to as their pbu
for his "orderly retirement" (R. 328, 329). The)e •
conversations culminated in a written ultimatum to lilt ·
plaintiff on April 31, 1961, received in evidence a•:
Exhibit II. By this time the defendants had satisfiea
themselves that they could retain the bulk of the clienli
of the firm (R. 247, 326, 327, 331). Caldwell admittfri
1
that in the 1961 discussions, plaintiff was advised nn
only that he would be included in the partnership after

10

·1tardi

\Jiarc

Bl, HH>2, but that the defendants would not

clients with him (R. 330).

DeJ:'endauts sought to justify their demands to
plaiutiff during the early part of 1961 on the ground
tliat plaintiff was offered the opportunity of purchasing
their interest in the partnership on the same basis as
they offered to buy him out. vVhile such offer may
]wYc beeu made as far as the physical assets, receivables
au<l similar items were concerned, the defendants admitted that they did not ever offer to share clients with
the plaintiff (R. 330). Defendants had satisfied themsehes that, according to their best judgment, they
!1ad the accounts in the palms of their hands (R.
:334). Moreover, at the time of their demands, the
rlefeudants believed that Mr. Jackson was incapable
of performing accounting functions, particularly in the
field of audits ( R. 331). Caldwell even told .Mrs. Jackson that the plaintiff was "having a mental problem,
that he should take a vacation, that he should retire"
(R. 419).

It is uncontradicted that by March, 1962, plaintiff
11~1s incapacitated insofar as his public accounting work
was concerned. Dr. Louis G. J\ioench, a practicing
]Jsyc·hiatrist whose qualifications were admitted by the
defendant (R. 235), stated that if objective symptoms
11ere manifest at any particular time that it would be
fair to assume that plaintiff's condition, knmvn as
'enile psychotic reaction (R. 336) would have progressed to the point of disability at the time that such

11

symptoms were manifest (cf 336, 339, 343). There is
some dispute in the evidence as to whether the
· d b efore or after March per.
. b'l'
manent d isa
i ity ex1ste
al,
1961. It would appear from the Caldwell testimonr
that the condition preceded that date. Mrs. Jacksou.'1
testimony was to the effect that the symptoms did 1101
appear until after the 1961 discussions when plaintiff
was notified in substance that the primary, substantial
and indispensible assets of the firm, namely the clients.
were being taken from him. Appellant asks this courl
to adopt the view that in either event, since the dis·
ability occurred prior to March 31, 1962, certain provisions of the 1959 agreement, integrated with the 19611
agreement, were applicable and that the defendants are ·
liabel for the damages and subject to the remedies provided in these instruments. The trial court dismisseu
the 1960 agreement as being irrelevant to the issue)
and made no appropriate findings applicable thereto.

This action was filed on the 22nd day of l\focu.
1962, after plaintiff's counsel had notified the defena
ants that they were in default under the agreementl
and were wrongfully dealing with the partnership asset). ·
Even after the filing of the action, the defendant Calo· '
well continued to purport to manage and deal witi
the assets and affairs as though they were his 01rr 1
private business. He advised plaintiff that if certain 1
demands were not satisfied, he would proceed to dispw •
of the assets as he chose (Ex. 17) . On April 11, 196!. :
after the plaintiff had filed a motion to compel In.' •
production of the partnership documents for exami·
1

•

1
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defendant Caldwell advised the plain1 JJ tha \: l 1c v. ould deli Yer files of clients to the plaintiff
1
111 ;1,1• upon :1 written receipt or request from the client
(Ji,\, ;fl). Deft:ndants' new firm, organized as of April
L HJ02. stayed in the same office; continued to utilize
the hooks awl records of the old firm including the
:icr·11uuh receivable journal which contained substantially all of the relevant and recent information concerning work in process of the firm; used the same
te]Pphone number; and in effect, continued to maintain
tl1e .same relationship to the bulk of the firm crents
as had been maintained by the old firm. Subsequently,
plaintiff and the defendants agreed upon certain disposition of physical assets and payments of amounts
in ronnection with the accounts receivable of the firm
as of March 31. The disposition of these assets was
expressly agreed, however, to be without prejudice to
the rights and contentions of the parties in the pending
action. (See Exs. 38, 40, and testimony of Edward 1\1.
Bown, R. 586) .
n:itwn ( H. ~(i, 7),

ARGU1\1ENT
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
FIND ON THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE
THAT THE FIRJ\I :MESSINA, JACKSON,
CALD,YELL & CO. HAD AN ASSET IN THE
XATURE OF GOOD 'VILL
13

A. Good will is judicially recognized as an asset.

Section 48-1-37, U.C.A. 1953, provides in subst·
. an1·,
that the partnership assets include all property belmi~.
ing to the partnership. An asset is any value or proper;\
which is salable or which may be converted into mone;
It is generally said that an asset is anything that wouirl
be available in the estate of a deceased to provide funJ.
for the payment of creditors. Black's Law Dictionar~.
4th Ed., 151-152 and authorities cited. This court Jia 1
explicitly recognized that good will is an asset. Jn '
Halverson v. Walker ( 1910) 28 Ut. 262, ll2 P. sot :
the court recognized the value of good will in the salt I~
of one-half interest in a barber shop. The court said: :
I

"Good will, as defined by Lord Eldon, mean~
nothing more than the probability that the ola
customers would resort to the old place."

1

I

In Vercimak v. Ostoich ( 1950), ll8 Ut. 253, 221 P(2di I
602, this court expressly recognized the existence I
of good will as an asset in a partnership. The court
held that simply because each of the partners had the I
right to continue separate businesses after dissolution, I
it did not mean that there was no good will which al·
tached to the business of the firm during its existence
The court stated explicitly that it chose to follow the
reasoning of lJfiller v. Hall, 65 Cal. App. (2d) 20~. ,
150 P(2d) 287, 288, and quoted with approval the fol·!
lowing language from I1 utchins v. Page, 204 :Ma~s.
284, 90 NE 565, 134 Am. St. Rep. 656:

I
1

1
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":\'either party had any right to avail himself
of I Ii~ good will of the business, after the termii wt ion of the partnership, without paying for
1t. lj~acl1 could commence a new business in his
o\\'ll name, ancl take a(b:antage of the fact that
he had formerly been a member of this firm. But
neither had a right, as against the other, to contiuue the busi11ess of the firm, and retain the
advantages that comes from a direct succession
and a continuation of a going business. The
rnlue of this right, so far as it had a transfer able
rnlue, belonged to both; and either could insist
upon having his share of the benefit of it."
The rationale of Jliller v. Hall, supra, which this
~ourt explicitly approved in Vercimak v. Ostoich, was
that eYell after dissolution of a partnership and although the partners had a right to compete with each
other following the winding up of the affairs of the
tirm, the partners had an affirmative duty to each other
to aceount for the value of the good will in the business.
The eourt q noted part of the foregoing language from
Hntchins v. Pa,qe, s1ipra, and said:
"In Ruppe v. Utter, 76 Cal. App. 19, 243 P.
715, 717, the court said :
" 'Good will is property recognized and protected by the law as such, and capable of sale and
transfer from one owner to another. It is an
asset ·which may be sold in connection with a
business.' "

*

*

*

"In the instant case, beyond question, the good
will of this business would have had a considerable nllue had the business been sold to a third
party."

15

An annotation at 65 ALR (2d) 521, et seq., super.
seding an earlier annotation at 44 ALR 518 de?,1
specifically with the question of partners' duty to ac
count to other partners for good will upon dissolution;
of the partnership. The sununary to the annotation i .
in part, as f o1lows:
..
l

I

"It seei;ns clear that in so .far as a partnershiv
can be said to have good will, such good will is
a proper item on accounting, whether the di~- 1
solution is caused by the death of a partner or
otherwise brought about. Indeed, the statement j
that good will must be included in the accountu1a !
if it is an a~set of the partnership is perhaps~ 1
tautology, smce of course all assets having any :
value must be accounted for, and the fruitful
inquiry is, rather, when can it be said that the
partnership does or does not have such an asset.,.

I

Appellant submits that where the evidence dern- 1
onstrates that the good will of a business has a value,
the authorities hold generally, and this court has un·
mistakenly embraced the proposition, that the value
of the asset must be taken into account in the dealing
of partners between themselves upon dissolution of !
the firm. The Utah cases and the decisions of California !
and Massachusetts which they follow are unmistakably ;
clear on this point.

I

I

I

I

B. Good will in client relationships is generally recog· ;
nized by public accountants as having an ascertainable ana
substantial value.

1

I

In Evans v. Gunnip, 36 Del. 589, 135 At!. (2d!
128, 65 ALR (2d) 513; ____ Del. ____ , 135 Atl (2d) 135. '

16

ALH ;):W, the Supreme Court of Delaware hehl
,,prcssly that good will was a value in a public account:inn partnership and that a retiring partner was entitled to share in such good will when the remaining
partners continued the business. The court ref erred
tu the testimony of public accountants at the trial to
tile rttect that there were formulae generally used in
pro,·ing the value of partnership good will. Prior
conrluct of the parties demonstrated that they had
placed a value upon the client relationships as a distinct
r:1lue of the business. The court rejected the argument
lhat there could be no good will in a partnership involving personal services where both partners are free to
compete with each other after the dissolution.
11 ,i

The existence of good will in relationships between
puhlic accountants and clients was unmistakably established by the evidence in the instant case. Public
accountants develop and maintain files and working
papers concerning the business activities of their clients
anrl become intimately acquainted with the business
and personal affairs of clients, including the very sen1iti,·e matters relating to federal and state taxation.
~Iessina, Jackson, Caldwell & Co. had such files. The
rridenrt:> disclosed that accounting work is performed
for clients over a period of time, and this also was true
ilf the subject partnership. This partnership of l\Iessina. Jackson, Caldwell and Co. actually maintained
rlftailed records to reflect the amount of work performed
on aecounts at various times of the year (Ex. 14).
Defendants' "work in process" records plainly demon-

17

strate that the nature of the accountant-client· rel at'ion
ship is relatively continuous; that there is always ,
very substantial amount of unfinished work upon ~lien;
problems .
It is a common occurrence for an accountant bi .
sell a practice ( R. 345, 346) . The administrator fJ!
executor of a deceased accountant is able to realize
substantial values for the sale of accounts. Local anrl '
national accounting organizations have establishea
standard procedures and formulae for the sale a1111.
evaluation of accounting practices ( R. 356, 358). The~e
formulae recognize definitive values in good will. A
value is placed upon a practice separate and apart from
the physical assets and the so-called book value of the
concern ( R. 349-383) .

It is not and cannot be disputed in the instant
litigation that good will has a recognized value in the
accounting profession. It is customary, upon the tcr·,
mination of partnerships engaged in public accounting 1
work, to recognize the good will value inherent in client ;
relationships (R. 303). The defendants' witnesse~, •
Psarras and Kirkham (R. 561-566, R. 566-568), boti1:
of whom were certified public acc?untants, .admitteJ j
their knowledge of the sales of public accountmg prac·
tices in the area. Both of these witnesses had been
involved in sales and had bid upon practices where
accountants had died or were leaving the area. Mr
Psarras admitted that he knew there was a practicr i
to acquire accounts from estates of deceased account·
1
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retiring accountants ( R. 565) and from
:ll'co11ntanls leaving the area (R. 564). Defendants'
t·ounsel referred to and used industry publications in
noss examining plaintiff's witnesses (R. 369 et seq.).
Tlte methods of evaluating good will are discussed more
full)' in Point IV of this brief. It is sufficient at this
iund1l!"r of the argument simply to reiterate that in
the accounting profession, the existence of good will
:lllrl the recognition of its values as positive, determinable assets is not disputed and cannot be disputed.
:ii its

( R. 504),

C. The history and conduct of the partners of Messina,
Jackson, Caldwell & Co. demonstrate that they recogniz:ed
that the good will of the partnership had a significant value.

The asset value to the firm of Messina, Jackson,
Caldwell & Co. of its clients was clearly and unmistakably recognized by the partners and its employees.
Grant Caldwell admitted that the partnership
actually paid employees a bonus for bringing new clients
into the off ice ( R. 605) . The employee obviously was
paid out of partnership funds. Patently, the partner~bip expected to derive a benefit from the expenditure
of these arnounts, and that part of that benefit neces~arily had to be the relationship established with the
client.
The individual partner's contributions to the firm
in terms of the accounts brought into the firm ·was
dearlr recognized in the partnership agreements. The
te,fonony of defendant Caldwell was, for example,
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that Marco Messina was responsible for bringing a. Iarr1e
~ercentage of cli:nts into the firm. His participah~1
m the partnership profits reflected his client -gett'mg
ability. During the period between 1953 and 1955, lie
was credited with 623 of the capital and share<l in
62 % of the profits (Ex. l) . Between 1955 and 195!.
his percentage was 50 %. Thereafter until his deali:
his percentage was 45% (Ex. 4). He maintained thii
interest in the profits and the capital notwithstandinir
t '
the admitted fact that he did not perform audit func· •
tions on firm accounts.
Conversely, Grant Caldwell became an employee·
in 1950, and from the beginning was doing audit work.
Yet his partnership participation was nominal until,
1955 when he was entitled to receive 20% (Ex. 2). i
The 1955 agreement provided that upon dissolution!
of the firm a "division of client accounts shall be made:
with the withdrawing partner based upon such facts
as contribute to an equitable and fair settlement oi ·
the remaining partners with the withdrawing partner.:
provided that upon withdrawal of Grant Caldwell,.
he shall be entitled to a division of client account):
obtained by the partnership after March 31, 1955." i
(Ex. 2, Art. VIII).
I

The partnership agreements over a period of more :
than ten years implicitly recognized a value in the busi·'
ness separate and a part from the physical assets as sud •
or the value of the assets as reflected on the partner ,
ship books. The understanding was that, upon volun
1
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t:n'Y withdrawal of a partner prior to 1958, Grant
caidwell would not share in the client accounts
iEx. 2, Art. VIII). Upon death or incapacity, in
the 1955 and 1958 agreements and upon death in
the 19.59 agreement, the intangible "going concern"
1rorth was recognized by requiring payment to the
disabled partner or the estate of the deceased in the
amount represented by a share of earnings of the
tirm during the year of death or disability and for
the two subsequent fiscal years. The 1955, 1958,
similar with
0111d Hl59 agreements are substantially
respect to the formula used in calculating this value.
The estate of the deceased or the disabled partner was
to receive the book value of its,,, capital account plus
his percentage of profits in the receivables billed but
not collected at the appropriate date, plus a percentage
11f work in process. In addition to these amounts, the
disabled partner or the estate of the deceased was to
receive a designated share of the profits of the firm
for the balance of the fiscal year in which death or
rlisability occurred and the succeeding two fiscal years
!Ex. 2, Art. X, cf Art. X of Exs. 3 and 4). It is
submitted that this provision of the agreement and this
l'oncept of the partnership relationship belies defendants' argument that the good will inherent in the client
relationship was to remain the property of the indi, ridual accountant who was serving the client. The
analysis of the handling of this matter in the Messina
tstate is particularly rewarding. Messina had brought
10 mewhere in the neighborhood of 65 % of the clients
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into the firm, according to defendants' own calculat'
' !(Jlh
(Ex. 20) . If the accounts had been deemed to h131·_
been his personal property rather than assets of t[,,
firm, Messina's administrator would have been able tr
sell these accounts in accordance with the obvious 81111
well recognized industry practice. The proceeds of th
sale would have gone into the estate and the partner·
would not have been able to obtain any interest in tlien,
except by bidding at the sale. When Messina die11
however, the administrator did not attempt to sell tilt
accounts; on the contrary, the firm continued to sem
them and to have all of the benefits of the accountant
client relationship inherent in them. Messina's estatt
was paid approximately $7 4,000.00 as his share of tnt
profits from the time of his death in August, 19.i~
through March 31, 1962 (R. 397, 400, 404; Ex. lh
The clients were retained intact for the firm.
The partnership agreement did not explicitly prr
vide in so many words that the deceased or disableJ
partner was being paid a percentage of profits for 11;
share in the good will of the business. The parties t•
the agreement were experienced, professional counselor
in matters related to taxation and tax saving derice'
It is reasonable to assume that they did not wish;,
reflect an asset as "good will" on the books of the sur
viving firm because good will, in an accounting serht
may not be subject to depreciation and could conceir
ably have other adverse tax consequences. The plan
simple fact of the matter is, however, that the g~~I
will value of these accounts was paid to the Mess

1

111
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rslate and that in consideration for that payment the
accounts stayed with the firm.

In summary on Point I, the record is clear in this
r·ase that good wilJ is judicially recognized as a partner~hip asset. Industry practice by and among public
accountants is to recognize the value of the good will
inherent in client relationships. The partners of Messina, .T ackson, Caldwell & Co. recognized and applied
the industry practice in the conduct of their business
and the formation of their partnership agreements. They
actually paid Messina's estate $74,000 for his share
of the good will in the partnership after his death.
Although the defend ants are all certified public accountants, none of them offered to deny any of the
relevant testimony of the plaintiff's experts with respect
to industry recognition of good will or to deny plaintiff's claim that good will was recognized by the partners
themselves in the Messina, Jackson & Caldwell firm.

The court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law did not actually deal in any realistic sense with
the positions taken by the plaintiff on this phase of
the case. The trial court skirts the entire problem with
the bland assertion that the plaintiff did not establish
by a preponderance of the evidence that the partnership had an asset known as good will. Appellant submits
that not only did the evidence preponderate to support
his position but that the defendants themselves, by their
own conduct and through their witnesses, admitted the
ralirlity of his contentions.
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POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING To
DETERMINE FROlVI THE UNDISPUTED
EVIDENCE THAT THE DEPENDANTSM.
PROPRIATED TO THEMSELVES, TO THE
EXCLUSION OF PLAINTIFF, THE GOOD
WILL OF THE PARTNERSHIP PRIOR Tn
THE TERMINATION OF THE FIRM.
At the trial court, the defendants argued that in·,
asmuch as they were free to compete for the busine),
of the clients after the firm was terminated, theu i
failure to account to the plaintiff for the value of tnt
accounts which they took with them did not constitult
a breach of duty. The evidence showed, however, thal
the defendants had successfully appropriated the ac· ':
counts to themselves more than a year prior to the time i
when the partnership actually terminated. If the de·•
fendants either individually or in concert had apprn '
priated some tangible asset, such as an automobile, !1
their own use during the period of the partnershir. •
certainly they would not argue that such conduct ex ;
cused them from accounting to the plaintiff for iti .
value. Yet, this is exactly the position taken by tl1f ,
defendants in the instant case insofar as their apprn :
priation of the good will of the clients was concerneu ;
1

1

1

I

In relevant respects, this case is similar to Smili.
v. Bull (1958, S. Ct. Cal.), 50 Cal(2d) 294, 325P(2il,
463. In that case the partners Smith and Bull operatr::
an advertising agency. During approximately one ye:ir
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prior to the termination of the partnership, Smith was
ill and was not active as a partner. The evidence was
that he was away from the office part of the time. The
other partner, Bull, gradually took over an account,
Seaboard Finance Company, which constituted the bulk
nf the business of the firm. After the partnership was
terminated the account stayed with Bull. When Smith
died, Bull refused to credit Smith's estate for any value
reflecting the good will of the firm in the Seaboard
account. The evidence showed that a confederate of
Bull named Roach had told an employee of the firm
that the main account was "in the palm of his hand;
he could take it anywhere he wanted to ... " Bull admitted that he told various people that Smith was
"erratic and eccentric and that he was taking so much
medicine that his mind was affected." (Pac. 466, 467).
The trial court found that the value of the good will of
the partnership was $53,391.66, based upon testimony of
acertified public accountant. Smith's estate was awarded half of such value. On the third rehearing of the case
the Supreme Court of California held that the trial court
judgment should be affirmed. Bull argued that inasmuch as he had the right to accept new business from
Seaboard after the dissolution of the partnership that
he should not be "penalized in damages." The California Supreme Court said:
"This . . . argument apparently stems from
defendant's theory that a dissolution of the partnership took place when he notified Smith that
he intended to 'liquidate' the firm."
25

The court then reviewed the facts to emphasizr th,
during the time that Smith was a member of the fo::',
Bull's conduct was calculated to assure himself the beil·
fit of the Seaboard account"
.
. "~efendant's argument ~h~t he is being peii:ii.
1zed m damages and proh1b1ted from accepti 1 ~
Seaboard employment, after dissolution, is ilt
void of merit. The judgment heretofore seH;rli,
did not purport to a ward plaintiff damages oe
cause of the appropriation of the Seaboard at
count, or any portion of the profit made by Bul1
from that account, but was concerned, so far 3 ·
is here pertinent, with the appropriation ~111 1
value of the good will of the business. (Emphasi·,
by the court) .
"There is no merit to defendant's contentl1111:
that a personal service organization has no goun t

will.

*

*

*

"In Miller v. Hall, 65 Cal. App. 2d 200, 21J.'i
150 P.2d 287, 289, where the partnership ha1!1
operated by a brokerage business, the court hela •
'From all of these cases, and many others,: :
appears to be well recognized that the good 1rill
of a business may have a considerable value. tlia11
while this value may be seriously affected I•;'
the competition of a retiring partner, the qt1'
tion of such value is one to be determined rn
the light of all the facts of a particular case, alii:
that where such a value exists and is appropri
ated by one of the former partners for his o:·,'
use and benefit he may be required to accni1111 ·:
the other partner for his interest in all/! s11 '
value as niay appear under the circ111nstro1t
1

1

1
'
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" 'In the instant case, beyond question, the
good will of this business would have had a considerable value had the business been sold to a
third party.' ,, (Emphasis supplied).
The court emphasized the fact that Bull waited
until he was sure that he would have the Seaboard
account before he terminated the partnership with
Smith. Quoting the earlier California case of Bergum
v. Weber, 135 Cal. App(2d) 389, 392, 288 P(2d) 623,
625, the court said:
"As the court stated in Bergum v. Weber,
Cal. App. 2d 389, 392, 288 P.2d 623, 625,
'The customers of a business are an essential part
of its goodwill. In fact, without their continued
custom goodwill ceases to exist, for goodwill is
the expectation of continued public patronage.
136

"

The court compared the conduct of Bull with the results
that would have been attained if Bull had sold the
business as a going concern. The court pointed out
that "had the Smith and Bull agency been sold to a
third person, that goodwill, because of the Seaboard
account, would have been considered a valuable asset
of the partnership." (Pac. 469) .

In the instant case it is clear that the dominating

force in the operation of the partnership after Messina's
death was defendant Grant Caldwell. Caldwell admitted that he had never had any professional accounting experience prior to his employment by the Messina,
Jackson firm (R. 318). He admitted that he had
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observed and studied the partners and their ",,1·1e11,.,
between the time of his employment and thrnugJ 111 w
the relevant period of time ( R. 319). He testified li1:tt
he had never believed that Rulon Jackson was qualilii,
to practice professional accountancy and that he liaii
no desire to become a partner of Jackson (R. 3!D
He said that the only reason he signed the rnri 1111,
partnership agreements between 1953 and 1960 11,,
because of Messina ( R. 319). Caldwell acknO\rledge
his continuous study of the clientele of the firm 1R.
319). As early as 1953, he had formulated judgme 1 \,
as to where the clients of the firm would go in the ere111 i
the partnership was terminated. And he admitted tha: 1
at no time did he disclose to the plaintiff his feelin~· ·
toward him or his lack of confidence in his professio11:1:
ability or his secret calculations with respect to tl1t
distribution of the clients. Following JYiessina's deatlt
Caldwell assumed direct and effective management 011
the firm. The office manager had discussions with him!
with respect to personnel policies, dissatisfaction:/'
other defendants (R. 237, 288), purchase of equipme11l [
(R. 241), and similar questions, although she did 1wi i
have similar conversations with Jackson (R. 239). Sl11 :
also had conversations with Caldwell with respect ti'
assignment of personnel to handle clients' business a11
what would happen to the account in the event of d11•
solution of the firm. It is admitted that neither )Ir'
Bateman, the office manager, nor Grant Caldwell. nn: r
the other defendants, discussed such matters with tli·
plaintiff. In March, 1960, notwithstanding his serrr
1

1
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1n:

intention to exclude plaintiff from the partnership,
Grant Caldwell executed an agreement with him which
clearly indicates that plaintiff was being led to believe
that the partnership would continue following the payout of the Messina estate (Ex. 5). Caldwell knew that
other accountants in the office were doing the work
on the accounts which were generally referred to as
Jackson's clients (R. 322). After the defendants had
had ample opportunity to assure themselves that they
could hold the bulk of the firm's business, they commenced having conversations with the plaintiff to the
effect that he was being excluded from the firm after
the payments to the Messina estate were completed.
In the early part of 1961, plaintiff was notified that
he should acquiesce in defendants' plan for what Caldwell brazenly characterized as plaintiff's "orderly retirement" (R. 329). Caldwell admitted that in the
early 1961 discussions, and at all times thereafter, he
told plaintiff that he would not continue the partnership with him after March 31, 1962 and that he would
not share clients with him (R. 330). At the time of
defendant's demands upon plaintiff to leave the premises, notwithstanding their solemn promises of only
eight months earlier, there were discussions as to
whether plaintiff could be excluded (R. 241). It became
common knowledge in the office that a new firm was
to be organized after the payout of the Messina estate,
and that plaintiff would not participate (R. 240, 242).
The defendants' position that their conduct was
,iustified because the clients could "go where they
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pleased" is obviously with tongue in cheek ' Det'ei I<l a111,,
counsel admitted that all the accounts and the good
inherent in client relationships belonged to llie lir:
(R. 234, 235). They had already assured tliemsel.:
that when Rulon Jackson was pushed out tlie r110111
substantially all of the clients would stay. Deftnd:p
knew that plaintiff was ill. Caldwell admitted that thti:
was an increase in the number of incidents where pbi
tiff manifest a loss of memory or forgetfulness 11
325). He related some of the office jokes about phii~
tiff's errors in deposit slips and the fact that his person
records were being maintained by someone else in ti,!
office (ibid). In the 1961 meetings, Caldwell told)Jr,
Jackson that he thought that plaintiff was "harina ,i
mental problem, that he should take a vacation, tl1:r
he should retire" (R. 419).
1

1

,,
1

1

~

I

When plaintiff was :finally forced out, defendam !
Caldwell, Nielsen and Campbell remained in the sarn'!
office, entered into a new partnership, kept all its phy; ~
cal files, including working papers, of the old firm. a1ni
even used the accounts receivable ledger of the i
firm ( R. 242, 243) . And, of course, they kept the bul :
of the one class of assets without which the bnsi11t"
could not operate, namely the clients.
11]

1

I

The Appellant asks this court to determine tit::
based upon the defendants' own admissions as to !]iii
conduct, that their converting the accounts to tbi..
selves prior to the termination of the partnersh'.~
tortious. The doctrine of Smith v. Bull is dispositni
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Summarizing on Point II, it is undisputed that the
accounts of Messina, Jackson, Caldwell & Co. had a
po~itive, determinable value at all times prior to March
r,
HI, 1962, and that they could have been sold. Indeed,
,,
thev were the most valuable asset the firm possessed.
11'
fh~ details of the methods of appropriation which
Grant Caldwell and the other defendants employed to
obtain these accounts are immaterial. All of the subiL tleties of their conduct may well be beyond direct evia11~.i dence. The undisputed fact is, however, that in all
1n ,
relevant respects the defendants appropriated the
1
tl • clients. During the term of the partnership and at least
\Ir
prior to the ultimatums delivered by defendants to
1g, ! plaintiff in the spring of 1961, they had determined to
!hr their own satisfaction that this extremely valuable
partnership was theirs to the exclusion of the plaintiff.
They knew that they had the accounts in the palms of
their collective hands; they knew that the plaintiff was
ill. Appropriation of the clients of the firm was the
1
Y' · culmination of a plan which had been formulated in
at:· the mind of Grant Caldwell seven or eight years earlier.
1
0
' ·
Appellant submits that the failure of the court to apply
IJ11i,
the principles of Smith v. Bull requires reversal .
1

1

11r:
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\t',

POINT Ill.

THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
REQUIRE DEFENDANTS TO ACCOUNT TO
THE PLAINTIFF FOR THE MARKET
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VALUE OF THE GOOD 'VILL IN TILE ,
COUNTS 'VHICH THEY APPUfH>RlAT;~lJ

Plaintiff established a precise rnarket rnltie \) l',1:1
good will represented bv
the clients served br,l ,\ir,.CS"t''··
.J
Jackson, Caldwell & Co. This evidence w·<-'
·
1,. a(I]
.I lll't•
from knowledgeable experts with experienee Iu 111
purchase and sale of accounts in the intermountain art
and in the state of Utah. Donald I-I. Pickett, a cerlint:
public accountant with experience in accounting ~iu1 ,
1950, identified and referred to a number of inrllllir.
publications related to buying and selling of punl:,
accounting practices. The publications inclndui l~,
Accounting Practice JHanagement Handbook eilitt:
by James H. McNeil, an article by Robert E. Witcl1.:
published in the Certified Public Accountant's H1rn1! f
book, which is a publication of the American InstiMj
of Certified Public Accountants; a study made b)· ~I
Sproul entitled "Accountant's Fees and Prunts,''
p11I I
.
I
lished by Professional and Trade books, Ltd., Lowl1::, i
1951; a work entitled Guides to Successful Acco1111li11:
Practices by Bernard Isaacson, who is second eM l
of the Practitioner's Forum, a regular departmenti
the Journal of AccountanCJJ, and various articlespu j
lis~ed in the J oumrnal. of _Account~mcy witl~ r,~spedi 1'
retirement plans, prof ess1onal etl11cs and 'a11at10n 1
practices (R. 347, 348). These publications 1rere l' 1 '~i
monly available to and used by members of the pulq
•
jl
accounting profession in the area (R. 34<8, 3±91 I I
testified as to the nature of the 0O'enera l considerab !
·
(R . ':J
3·0\ · ·q
involved in the purchase of a practice
1

1

I

f

1
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stated that in his judgment and as a result of his experirnee au<l studies, the formula which would represent
~fair and reasonable one to be used by a willing seller
and a willing buyer to arrive at a market price for a
practice would be represented by 100% of the prior
itar's gross fees (R. 359). While there would be adjustments for non-recurring business, the industry
reeognized such a formula as being reasonably accurate.
On cross examination, Mr. Pickett made reference to
a plan described in one of the identified publicatio!:s
as the "Bridgeport Plan". Under that particular procedure, the purchaser would be expected to pay 1003
of the gross fees of clients who had been with the firm
four years or more; 75% of the fees of clients who had
been with the firm from three to four years; 50% of
the fees of clients having a history of two to three
years, and 25% of the fees of clients being with the
firm from one to two years. In addition, the purchaser
would pay 25% of the amounts received as special fees
during the preceding four years (R. 369) . Mr. Pickett
i applied these formulae, together with his own experi·
i ence in the purchase and sale of accounts locally and
made a judgment with respect to the amount for which
1
i the clients of the Messina, Jackson, Caldwell firm
, \ could have been sold. It was his judgment that the good
1 will Yalue of the firm was $150,000. From this sum he
1
,i deducted the good will value of the accounts served
i\ hy Jackson, Maxwell & Co., the firm with whom the
\ plaintiff became associated after the termination of the
partnership with the defendants. From Mr. Jackson's
1

[,\
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share of .Messina, Jackson, Caldwell dicnts' (-~•p 7 .J.111111
•
he deducted the total ntlue of the elieuts• th·tt
.
( l\t'1:1
the Jackson, l\Iaxwell firm ( $17 ,500) to arriYe at .
net amount due from the defendants to tJ 1,,' Ill a111
as the balance due plaintiff for his share of the "' .
will of the firm, in the sum of $57,000. An apph~t :
on a comparable basis of the generally accepted in<lush I
formula, to-·wit: 100% of gross billing after <lednl'i
of non-recurring fees, would result in an a11 arr!
plaintiff of $60,698. An application of the lhidgep l
Plan results in an award to plaintiff of $58,605. J!t
sina's estate received $7 4,000, which was 4;·v;. uf 1', 1
good will. One hundred percent of the good will, the~I
fore, should be valued at $164,000, and the amnu i
to be awarded to l\fr. Jackson would be $61,085 inl
payment was calculated upon the amount paid !1111
:Messina estate. A tabulation of these factors in i I
I
valuation of good will is appended to this brief i
Appendix A.
111

I

I

The defendants called two certified public arc11111
ants in the area. In effect, these witnesses admitted il
it was common practice to buy and sell accounts. E !
of them had participated in such purchases or sale 1 I
each had exercised his own judgment in the vahwli,:
of practices. Neither of these defendants <lenieil'
validity of the approaches utilized by Mr. Piclr i
Neither of them denied the applicability of the form:.:
100% of gross billings in an ordinary purchase sit··
tion. 'Vhile these witnesses testified as to their h
edge in two separate distress sales, neither of:] !
1

•
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:

tleuied that a going practice could be sold in the market
upon the application of one or more of the industry
formulae established by plaintiff's evidence.
Although all of the defendants are certified public
accountants and have access to the industry information
utilized by l\fr. Pickett in his valuation, none of them
offered their testimony to deny either in substance or
effect his conclusions as to the valuation of the good
1rill in the firm. On the contrary, Mr. Caldwell admitted that when new partners were admitted to the
firm beginning April l, 1962, consideration was given
to the amount of practice which they brought with
them.
Appellant suggests that it is appropriate for this
court to determine that Appellant is entitled to a judgment against the defendants in the sum of $57,500 plus
interest since April l, 1962 on the ground that it represents the lowest amount which he would receive upon
application of the formulae in the record.
The approaches to the plaintiff upon the question

of valuation of good will were substantially identical

to those approved by the court in Evans v. Gunnip
(S.Ct. Del. 1957) 36 Del. 580, 135 A(2d) 128, 65 ALR
(2d) 1957; ____ Del. ____ , 135 A(2d) 134, 65 ALR(2d)
320,andSmith v. Bull (S. Ct. Cal. 1958), 50 Cal.(2d)
294, 325 P (2d) 463. Particularly since the defendants
did not avail themselves of any opportunity to deny
the ralidity of plaintiff's approach, and the fact that
!he computations concernmg damages are in accord-

35

ance with the u~disputed industry practice, Appelb:;
suggests that tlus court should instruct the l(l\\'"r
~ ('111111
to make an award in a sum certain without reqtll)J,ir
·:,
further proof on the subject.
'

POINT IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING T!i
REQUIRE DEFENDANTS TO ACCOUNT'Hi
PLAINTIFF FOR THE VALUE OF 'VORK n
PROCESS SINCE MARCH 31, 1962 BASED
UPON THE PROXIMATE INVESTMENTn
SUCH ASSET PRIOR TO SAID DATE.
Defendants, acting by defendant Grant R. Ca!Q
well, purported to make an accounting to the plainti~:
after the instant action was filed for the amount oi
credit plaintiff was to receive for work in process. Prior
to the termination date of the old firm, to-wit: Marci
31, 1962, it had incurred certain expenses in antiri·
pation of fees to be paid in the future by firm client
The amounts which were billed as of March 31, 19u!
and prior thereto were accounts receivable of the firm.
the parties have no substantial dispute with respect'',
the amount of money which the plaintiff should receir,I
for these items. But the investment made in the fe1·1
which were still in process and unbilled as of the kr
mination date gave rise to a substantial contrwrsr •
1

1

It is Appellant's position that he is entitled;
share in fees received from clients whose work wai'
36

prc•ce~s on .March 31, 1962 based upon the total pro-

iortionate investment made in the fee compared with
:he im·estment made in the fee after the effective
termination date. Defendants' own figures showed that
the old firm had invested a total of $58,203 in the amount
if fees received. The investment consisted of $6,936
in travel expense and $51,267 in time expense. These
figures are from the defendants' own computations
as they appear in Exhibits 14 and 32. The travel expense for the new firm for the period following March
:n, 1962 was $3,760. After making an adjustment
for a time rate increase made by the new firm after
, 1Iarch 31, 1962, the defendants effectively conceded
al the trial that the time expense of the new firm for
which it was entitled to credit was $45,435.00 (Ex.
32). Thus, using defendants' own figures, the total
investment in the fee by the new firm was $49,195,
and the total investment by the old firm was $58,203.
The total fee for the entire year for these same clients
was $107,398. Appellant submits that the old firm
should have received 54.19% of the fees, having inmted 54.19% of the time and expense. The new firm
would receive 45.81 % of fees, having made a 45.81 %
investment. A tabulation of these figures appear as
follows:
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Total

forE1J1i1,
F'ee Ye::

Item
Old Firm New Firm
Time expense
$51,267.00 $45,435.00 $ 96,70;1:
Travel expense
G,936.00
3,760.00
10,Gn(;i
Total expense
58,203.00
49,195.00
107,3981,
Percentage of
costs incurred
54.19%
45.81 %
10(1
Amount of fees due old firm at 54.19%
of total fees ($120,861.00)
65,49j11
Amount of fees due new firm at 45.81 %
of total fees ($120,861.00)
55,360.I

Rather than adopting plaintiff's theory concrr:
ing an allocation of work in process credit, the tn:
court followed the proposal of Grant Caldwell (Fin:
ing No. 20; R. 191). Under the Caldwell plan, ti
Messina, Jackson firm would receive a total credit
$52,550.75 plus travel expense of $·6,936, for a tolt
of $59,543.75. In other words, based on Mr. Caldwell
calculations, the old firm would receive only 49~
the fees while having incurred 54% of the expen
The new firm would receive 51 % of the fees wl1i
having incurred only 45% of the expense. Cald11r
achieved this inequitable result by applying two nwtu·
matical procedures: ( 1) He deducted the "travel :1r,
maintainment" expense from the total expenses !:
curred by the respective firms. Since the old firm Ji:,
travel expense of $6,936.42 and the new firm 0(
$3,753.18, the result was to reduce the investment ·
the old firm and therebv decrease the percentagi
fee which it would rece~ve. (2) Caldwell rnnde
1

1
•
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iudiridual allocation of the fee for each client, rather
than using total charges on the basis of applying a
reasonable average profit alloc~tion over the entire
,-ear. Appellant suggests that such accounting manipuiation is falacious on its face because the result is inequitJhle. It may be that there are situations where the
amounts of money invested in time expense should be
credited before the fees are divided. The fees paid by
clients included all expenses of the firm including the
travel expense used in calculating the amount of the
fee. The client's bill did not itemize travel expense as
aseparate item any more than it itemizes rent or stenographic cost. The firm's purpose in recording travel
expense was only to analyze its internal operations.
It is as logical to deduct stenographic expense before
dividing the fee as to deduct travel expense. Would
Caldwell have used that device if it had suited his purpose? The device of separate computations for each
client is equally pernicious. Defendants were in control of all the records during the whole relevant period.
Appellant submits that the trial court's adoption of
the Caldwell computation on this point is erroneous
and should be reversed. Appellant submits that a device
1rhereby defendants come up with 51 % of the fee after
incurring only 45 % of the expenses of service to the
account was conceived by design rather than by application of pure accounting theory. Such a disparity
might occur in serving IO or 15 accounts, but defendants had 145 accounts and the work for them exlfn<led OYer an entire year. In a normal operation,
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the results achieved by Caldwell could not happen:''
would not happen.
·

POINT V.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING J,
FIND AND DETERlHINE ALTERNATI\!
LY THAT PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLEDTi
RECOVER DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF.
CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARm.
DATED MARCH 7, 1960.

I

Plaintiff pleaded in the alternative that the 1,
fendants breached a contract dated March 7, 196oac:
that plaintiff was entitled to recover damages pursuJ
to the provisions of that instrument. The defendani
admitted the execution of the contract. The court r-i
fused to make any Findings of Fact or Conclmiri
of Law with respect to the issues involved on this cat·;
of action. The court found simply that the contr
was executed, but that it was immaterial to the im1
in the case and completely ignored all of the ol~j
questions involved. The relevant facts with resped/
the determination of the issues on this cause of adq
were not and cannot be disputed.
j
I

1

;

The last partnership agreement executed by M~I
Messina during his lifetime was dated as of Apr~ I
1959. '¥hereas the prior instruments had been r~
pared by the plaintiff, the 1959 agreement (Ex. ' 4)~:!,,
prepared for the partners by the firm of Semon:
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Senior (R. 227) . This instrument does not explicitly
iruiide for the continuation of the partnership after
:he payout of the Messina estate. The understanding
that the firm would continue, however, is implicit from
the fact that Messina's estate did receive its full share
of payment for the value of the good will inherent in
, the partnership accounts, and that these accounts were
: served by the partnership after the estate was paid.
If this had not been the intention of the parties, there
:. would have been no reason for the surviving partners
to agree to pay the estate of the deceased its share of
: earnings for more than two years after the date of
'J death.
l'.

I

On March 7, 1960, defendants Nielsen, Campbell
ir\ and Caldwell executed an agreement with the plaintiff
r·: which was received in evidence as Exhibit 5.
IJ.

If'

Paragraph 6 of the instrument contains certain
aL, provisions applicable to the distribution of profits dur, ,'. ing the time of the payout of the Messina estate and
; ~j :nding March 31, 1962. Certain provisions of the 1959
1, l urntrument were applicable in the event of a death of
C11
•
•
• ! any of the partners but were not applicable m case
11
t : of disability. Prior partnership agreements had pro1 zided for protection to a partner upon disability and
!ad there is no explanation of the omission of such pro1rli \ tection in th: 1959 agreement other than the ~act th~t
r1 Marco Messma was known to have been seriously ill
Idi at the time of the execution of the 1959 instrument and
P the partners may have believed that he was on the
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verge of disability when he executed it. In a ,
n:1 t\11
paragraph 7 of the 1960 instrument (Ex 5)
.·
•
pror1,j
as follows:

'.'T· In the event of death or permanent
abihty of any of the parties hereto tJ11' 8 .1 '
. . ' · i1gn
ment shall become null and void msofar a, ,
deceased ?r disa~l~d p.arty is concerned, aiiu
p~rtnersl~1p participation shall be in accoroa
with Articles VIII, IX and X of the parti1, I
ship agreement of Messina, Jackson, Ca!d11,
& Compa~y dated April 1, 1958 and amenrit
as of April 1, 1959, provided, further, that in!!
event of death or permanent disability to,~,
party hereto, the above agreement shall nu
theless remain binding to the surviving or r· i
maining parties."
.:

11

1

1

1

11

/

,,
11

Article X of the 1959 agreement, which was r: 1
ferred to in the 1960 agreement, provides that the sll'I
viving partners shall cooperatively carry on the busin~·I
to enable performance of the payout plans proviac,\
in Article XI and that he shall not compete with l ·I
partnersh~p or serve any of the partnership ~lients ai,.:I
that he will pay the sum of $500 for each ' .10latwn, I
his covenant .plus one-half. any co~pensahon den'',.1
from rendermg the proh1b1ted service. As explaw'
infra, the 1960 agreement was applicable in the eii;I
of death or disability. A composite of Article X, taklli,I
into account the changes effected by the 1960 agr"'I
ment, is as follows:

o!

"The parties hereto each for himself, prn
and agree with the other partners here!~ t]i·~-1
after the [permanent disability J of one ot tk :
111
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'·

he as a survivor will continue as a partner and
cooperatively carry on the partnership business
for the fractional year in which [permanent disability J of one of them occurs and for the two
full fiscal years thereafter, for the purpose of
completing the payout to the [permanent disabled] partner (as provided for in Article IX
hereinabove.)

"If a surviving partner does not cooperatively

carry on the partnership business with the other
surviving partner or partners for the purpose of
carrying out the plan of payout to the [permanently disabled} partner as provided for in Article IX hereinabove, then such action shall constitute a withdrawal by him from the partnership. Upon such withdrawal by him he shall not
be entitled nor shall he have any right to receive
any payment on account of his interest in the
partnership until payment in full has been made
to the [permanently disabled} partner.

"Further, in order to assure full pay-off to the
[disabled] partner, under Article IX hereinabove, the partners, parties hereto, each for himself covenants and agrees with the other parties
hereto, that should he so withdraw from this
partnership after obligation has arisen to pay
off the [permanently disabled] partner and before full performance of such pay-off:
"I. That he will not serve any client of the

partnership served by the partnership within one
year prior to the effective date of his withdrawal
from the partnership;
"2. That he will pay to the [permanently disabled] partner the sum of $500.00 for each violation of his covenant and promise hereunder
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plus or,ie-half of any_ c?mpensation derired 11
rendermg such proh1b1ted service."
•
Caldwell admitted that he construed the l96fJ agr1
~ent to mean that in the event Jackson became incai:
c1tated, the applicable provisions of the 1959 agrr
ment would become effective (R. 558, 559). There
no doubt that the defendants refused to cooperatin!
carry on the partnership business with Mr. Jach:;
The evidence is unmistakably clear that during il
spring of 1961, they told him that they would notr.I
main partners with him, that they would not s~i:I
accounts with him, and that they would not confo:'
their association or any association with him as a parlnt!
Their answer admits that they refused to carry onfo
business as partners with him after March 31, 190!.

It is also unmistakably clear and cannot be rea~of
ably disputed that the evidence shows that some t~
before March 7, 1960, the date of the 1960 agreemrl
and March 31, 1962, plaintiff became totally and~e:j
manently disabled insofar as his ability to functiou~i
.I
a public accountant was concerned. Appellant contenu.• 1
that the evidence reasonably fixes the date of tlrn
capacity as the spring of 1961. It was during this peri!11
of time that Caldwell told Mrs. Jackson that in Cik
well's opinion plaintiff was having mental proble!Ji
that he should retire. The evidence showed that pla~
tiff's conduct had become so erratic prior to the spriL
of 1961 that it was the subject of frequent office jolr
Mrs. Jackson testified that she noticed no abnom I
behavior of any consequence until following the t~. ·
1
1
1
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when the plaintiff had been delivered the ultimatums
ov the defendants with respect to leaving the firm.
1\rhether the appropriate date was before or after
. ~larch 31, 1961, however, relates only to the plaintiff's
riuht to obtain a proportionate share of earnings after
jJardi 31, 1963. It is conceded that he received his share
of partnership earnings for the year ending March 31,
!962. His disability occurred after March 31, 1961.
At least he was entitled to a percentage of the partnership earnings for the year ending March 31, 1963
plus the amount of formula damages as provided in
Article X. These damages consisted of one-half of the
fees from accounts serviced plus $500 for each account
~Tongfully serviced in violation of the agreement. Defendants serviced 149 partnership accounts after their
oreach. (This figure is the result of simply counting
toe number of clients as reflected in the partnership
records and working papers in evidence, cf. Ex. 6,
14, 20). At $500 per account, plaintiff is entitled to
recover $74,500 for this item. It is impossible to determine the actual earnings of the defendants after March
ol, 1962 because they joined forces with other accountants and the total earnings of the firm after that date
were computed on different bases. Appellant contends
tllat a reasonable computation of such earnings would
oe an average for the three fiscal years ending 1960,
1961 and 1962. Such amount would be $27,203. Fifty
[lercent of the fees received from the accounts serviced
for the year following March 31, 1962 is $77,055.50.
l'nder the contract theory, therefore, plaintiff is entitled
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to recover, in addition to the amounts due hiin f
.
m~
m process as of March 31, 1962, the sum of $17S7",
plus interest at 6% from March 31, 1962.
'oR,

Appellant submits that under the prorision,
Rule 8 (a) and 8 ( e) and the authority of Rosan&r
Larsen, (1962), 14 Ut(2d) 1, 376 P(2d) 146,the,t
pellant is entitled to a determination of the issues ;
sented in this cause of action. The undisputed f;
support planitiff's claim for relief.
·
,,
1

CONCLUSION

I

I

It can hardly be doubted that partners owe toed
--,
other the duty to refrain from converting partnerskl
assets to the exclusion of each other. The error oHI
I
trial court apparently results from the failure to rea~i
that the good will of :Messina, Jackson, Caldwell &Cl
was a valuable asset of the firm and that when thd0,
f endants converted the good will inherent in the clir:)
relationships to their own use they were perpetratlli:!
a wrong upon the plaintiff. As clearly decided il
Smith v. Bull, the defendants cannot excuse theirfau[i
to account to plaintiff upon dissolution of the furui,·1
this valuable asset by arguing that they had the riii.
to compete with the plaintiff after dissolution wk
the facts demonstrate that they had converted thea~i
to themselves during the time that they were partw·.I
of plaintiff. The good will could have been sol~ et!ll
during the existence of the firm or upon its terminit,• 1
Failure to account to the plaintiff for his share iii '
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i

ralue is clearly wrongful and the judgment of the trial
court to the contrary requires reversal.
The work in process allocation proposed by the
defendants and a pp roved by the court does not achieve
justice between the parties as far as this asset is con~erued. Even though the arithmetical processes employed to reach the result may be accurate, plaintiff
is entitled to share in the fees received from the clients
to whom the work in process allocation is applicable
upon the basis of the investment in the fee of the old
firm in ratio to the total investment in the fee by the
defendants' new firm after April 1, 1962. The court's
ruling to the contrary requires reversal on this phase
of the case.
Alternatively, this court should determine that the
conduct of the defendants constitutes a breach of the
agreement between them and the plaintiff of March
i, 1960, and that plaintiff is entitled to the damages
provided in that instrument. Appellant submits that
the damages can be computed from the existing record
io that no further evidence is required. At the least,
the court should remand the case for determination of
damages upon the contract theory.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4th day
of October, 1965.
GEORGE M. McMILLAN and
FRANKLIN D. JOHNSON
1020 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
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APPENDIX A
VALUATION OF GOODWILL

-

100% Gross Billings after
Deduction no-recurring fees

Mr. Pickett's Value

Based on personal experience,
generally accepted formulae
and criteria and the relevant
facts obtained from operating
experience of firm.
Total Value
Good Will

Total fees,
Schedule A
Deduct non-recurring
Schedule C

$172,526.
13,950.

Bridgeport Plan

I Total Fee
Normal Fees
100% fees, 4-yr. clients
75% fees, 3-4 yr. clients
50% fees, 2-3 yr. clients
25% fees, 1-2 yr. clients
Non-recurring Fees
25% of special fees for preceding
4 yrs.*

$128,166. I
9,375. I
18,535.
2,500.

$128,166.
7,031.
9.263.
625.

I

--

$ 74,000. = 45~;
Ir;
1.633. 164.000 ~100';
'

I
I

55,800.

13,930.
$159,040.

$158,576.

$150,000.

I

I

Payment to Messina Estate
for Good Will

Fee Times
Percent

$164,000.00

NET CREDIT TO PLAINTIFF FOR GOOD "TILL
Appraised value of accounts
serviced by Jackson, Maxwell
& Co.
Total Value
Good Will
50% Total
Less retained
Net Due Plt. for
Good Will

Total actual fee to Jackson,
Maxwell & Co. minus non-recurring fees

17,500.
75,000.
17,500.

18,590.
79,288.
18,590.
$ 60,698

$ 57,500.

'For p

Normal Fees
100% fees, 4-yr. clients
75% fees, 3-4 yr. clients
50% fees, 2-3 yr. clients
25% fees, 1-2 yr. clients
Non-Recurring Fees
25% of special fees for preceding
4 yrs.*

18,590.
0
0
0

9,300.

18,590.
0
0
0
2,325.

--20,915.00
82.000.00
20,915.00

s 20.915.

s

$ 58,605.

$ 61,085.00

79,520.
20,915

.
ecial
1 t 0 ti1
urposes of this calculation, special fees for the year ending March 31, 1962 were assumed to be equa
~ sp
Years. The compa t'
.
. .
h
ption is conservative.
ra 1ve operatmg statements for prior years (Ex. P-21) md1cate that sue assum
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The highest value in other
formulae is used for comparaii \·e purposes.

fees
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for each of the three pr·eceding

